little in offering joint programs and economizing on certain costs even as they use the same casebooks in their courses and borrow from one another's libraries? Why do two competing auto makers rarely sell one another components or use the same expert advertis ing agency or law firm but then quite often equip their cars with identical tires or consider the same architect when planning new office buildings? The literatures on the boundaries of the firm and on conflicts of interest do not much investigate these fundamental questions, and other literatures, such as that which explores exclu sive dealing arrangements, touch on the puzzles associated with these questions in but passing fashion.
My focus in this Essay on the nature of the relationship between cooperation and competition is in many ways an attempt to interest those who work in law in what economists think of as the "make-or buy" decisions of firms. I also aim to advance our thinking about these decisions. The make-or-buy expression draws attention to the choice between an organization's internal expansion on the one hand, and its ability to purchase from externally organized produ cers on the other. Part of my claim, or at least of my starting point, is that the make-or-buy decision is influenced by an apparent disin clination in some cases to share sources of supply with one's com petitors. This influence might lead firms to choose between making or not, which is to say between expansion on the one hand and contentment or passivity on the other. Firms may eschew the alter native of expanding by way of purchasing from external suppliers.
Part I sketches the framework for my questions and analysis and offers some refinements to the make-or-buy perspective. Part II sets out the central thesis. It suggests circumstances in which third parties, or markets more generally, facilitate cooperation among competitors. Whether the roles of these outside parties are under stood in psychological, economic, or temporary disequilibrium terms, they provide important lessons for the theory of the firm and for our understanding of the make-or-buy decision. Part III returns to the starting point and considers alternative explanations for the puzzling arrangements that I attempt to explain. I claim, of course, that these alternatives are inferior, but they are not without their own attractions and lessons. Part IV turns to the role of law.
I. COOPERATION AND THE SIZE OF FIRMS
Attention to the make-or-buy decision dates back at least to Coase's famous article on the theory of the firm.1 If agency costs did not becomes more serious as a given firm grew, then we might expect that firm to choose to make things it needed, expanding in the process, because it could control factors better than if it were to buy these things from external sources which, almost by assump tion, would generate transaction costs. The early literature thus emphasized that a different, or competing, set of transaction costs, namely agency costs, becomes more serious with internal expansion so that the make-or-buy-decision weighs internal and external transaction costs with the size of the firm hanging in the balance.2
Later authors refined this perspective, sometimes turning it on its head, and an entire academic industry has developed in thinking about these transaction costs.
When I refer to cooperation as a further determinant of the firm's boundaries, I mean that if, to take a plain example, the ad vantages associated with making something internally run up against problems of economies of scale or simply lumpiness, then an ability to share or to cooperate with another firm might deter mine whether internal expansion takes place. Thus, a firm might build a new factory, where the efficient factory size is expected to yield output greater than the firm projects it will need for its own immediate purposes, if it could line up another firm or even a com-1. Ronald H. Coase, Th e Nature of the_Firm, 4 EcoNOMICA 386 (1937) , reprinted in RONALD CoASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAw 33 (1988).
2. I recognize that this expression implies that a firm can be distinguished from a set of arrangements, contracts, or norms. See Steven N.S. Cheung, Th e Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1983) . (Vol. 97:216 petitor, to buy some of the output of this new factory. If the trans action were arranged in advance in the form of a joint venture or the like, then we might think of the two firms as engaging in exp li cit cooperation. If, on the other hand, the economy of scale is achieved by an outsider building a factory of efficient size and selling its out put to our firm and to its competitor, then we might think of the two buyers as engaging in imp li cit cooperation. Falling in between these two alternatives is the possibility that our firm builds the fac tory itself but sells some of the output, perhaps even to a competi tor. The trading between competitors is now explicit although the investment in the factory was implicitly cooperative. In yet starker contrast, our firm might be disinclined to sell to a competitor; sym metrically, its competitor might be disinclined to buy from our firm (which is to say its competitor). Similarly, these firms may decline to buy components from suppliers who sell identical components to competitors. And, in the most extreme version, they may refuse to deal with suppliers who deal at all with competitor firms. I think of the firms' decisionmakers in these last categories as disinclined to cooperate. Possible motivations for these disinclinations are taken up below. In any event, I use cooperation to signal a transaction implicating a competitor rather than any other make-or-buy decision.
When an enterprise, E, declines to cooperate, it may find itself with no alternative external source of supply. Any efficient sup plier might, for example, need to sell to E's competitors in order to survive; E's refusal to implicitly cooperate precludes E from purchasing its supplies. In such cases, the noncooperating firm, E, must still decide whether to make or not, which is to say whether to grow or not. It is thus immediately apparent that a disinclination to cooperate bears on the size of the firm. Make-or-buy is in this way an incomplete description of the important determinant of organi zational arrangements with which it deals. A more complete de scription is that a firm decides whether to make or buy or do neither -perhaps because it prefers not to cooperate. Less obvi ous but as important is the point that the make-or-buy choice itself may be a product of a firm's inclination to cooperate. Transaction costs alone might point to a decision to buy, but the difficulty or cost of arranging for exclusivity (so as to avoid cooperation) might lead to a decision to make.3 3. Without getting too far ahead of the argument, it is perhaps obvious that the firm might make and sell to a competitor even though it is unwillin g to buy in a cooperative way. An upscale, elegant retailer might, for example, be unwillin g to stock a product bearing the The disinclination to cooperate may also affect the boundaries of such entities as families, cities, and nations which also decide whether to undertake new ventures and modify old ones. The busi ness firm's choices among contractual arrangements with outside suppliers, internal growth (with or without sales to competitors), and refusals to cooperate (even if that means neither making nor buying) have counterparts where these other organizations are con cerned. Some of these counterparts have received more attention than others. The literature on international relations does not re gard trade among nations in ways suggested by the theory of the firm. Conventional thinking about not-for-profit entities is hardly peppered with explorations of specialization and transaction costs.
On the other hand, the literature on local government and finance has considered questions of annexation and privatization in terms that would seem familiar to theorists of the corporate firm,4 and name of a less elegant competitor, but the competitor might be willin g to sell a product with Elegant's label, and Elegant might not regard its image as tarnished by the comparison outside of its premises. Elegant could make the product or buy it from an outsider with some conditions attached regarding the outsider's other sales.
4.
The discussion below takes account of the fact that municipalities may compete with one another less than most business firms compete against rival firms. Cooperation may therefore be less threatening.
In Saul Levmore, Irreversibility and the Law: The Size of Fi nns and Other Organizations, 18 J. CoRP. LAW 333 {1993), I argued that the tradeoff between the agency costs associated with internal expansion and those associated with transacting with an outside entity -the core of the make-or-buy decision -needs to be understood in a way that incorporates the agency problems absorbed by that outside entity. The outside entity expands in order to produce that which the first entity chooses to buy rather than make on its own. Thus, our theory of the firm must understand agency costs in relative, or opportunity cost, tenris. X will externalize production and make arrangements with Y when Y can produce more cheaply than X {by enough to offset the greater friction present in X-Y arrangements as compared to monitoring and other organizational matters internal to X). A second step in the analysis is then to see the analogous relativistic character of "irreversibility," a term which refers to a kind of ratcheting, stickiness, or "hysteresis" such that for legal and psycho logical reasons organizations are slower to contract than to expand. Income tax laws, for example, would seem to be a cause of irreversibility because the well-known lock-in effect of realization rules makes taxpayers disinclined to sell appreciated assets, even to higher valuing users. But because Y is likely to face the same tax laws as X, there is a serious limit to any claim that the size of X, in terms of its make-or-buy decisions, is much influenced by this factor. Indeed, once we see that previous analyses suffer from the failure to compare alternatives, it becomes obvious that we can often say no more than that the more efficient a manager, the less the need for external price signals.
One obvious implication of this approach to irreversibility and the make-or-buy decision is that sole proprietorships are unlike firms with delegated authority. A publicly owned firm may set up barriers to expansion because it fe ars that its agents will selfi shly be biased toward growth -but ex post, when these agents do lunge at opportunities for growth and avoid efficient contractions, it is difficult to predict whether these firms will make more or buy more than their counterparts with no separation of ownership and control. The decisions are unlikely to be identical, unless the combination of precommitments (against internal and other expansions) and subsequent managerial behavior magically balances at the precise point reached by the owner-manager. Of course, sole proprietors must either absorb the agency costs associated with contracting with outsiders or the costs associated with internal [Vol. 97:216 there are occasional hints in a variety of fields that the soil is ripe for the planting of a unified theory of boundaries. I do not intend in the present paper to aim so high, but I do suspect that this discus sion, which considers a variety of examples of disinclinations to co operate, constitutes a useful step in developing a complete theory of boundaries.
II. THE ROLE OF MARKETS

A. Markets as Means of Implicit Cooperation
Insufficient attention has been paid to what I have been calling the disinclination to cooperate. This inattention leaves us largely with shared experiences, intuitions, and anecdotal evidence as the sources of data with which we might then "explain" the cooperation among competitors that is and is not found. More rigorous testing of my claims will need to follow; rejection or modification and im provement are likely.
Put plainly, one claim is that markets sometimes intermediate and allow parties to overcome their disinclination to cooperate. It bears emphasizing that disinclinations to cooperate even in implicit fashion must surely have a direct effect on the decision to make or buy; an inclination to cooperate implicitly but not explicitly may unambiguously encourage buying rather than making even where a competitor could internally produce -perhaps more than it needs of some component -at a lower cost than that associated with the best outside supplier.
A few concrete examples of the markets-as-facilitators idea make the point better than a more abstract model or description.5
Competing auto makers equip their cars with identical tires purchased from Firestone, Michelin, and other unrelated manufac turers, but it would be surprising to find a component in a Ford growth and delegation, including the costs of obtaining funds from creditors (a source dis cussed at greater length below).
Not-for-profit organizations, including governmental units, offer fewer obvious implica tions. I have already suggested, see id. at 356-58, that these organizations may be "stickier"
than their for-profit counterparts in both directions. Universities and museums, for example, seem even less likely to shrink than do other organizations but they also seem less quick to expand. There are optimistic and pessimistic explanations for this sort of behavior. I turn below to aspects of this comparison that implicate the idea advanced here of a refusal to cooperate. See infra Part III.
5. I am tempted to concentrate with these examples on law schools and law firms, in part because these are fascinating organizations of great interest to most of my readers. There is a good deal to be gained, however, from suppressing this temptation and proceeding as if the business of law training and practice were not our real focus. In any event, it is useful to see how much law is like other businesses. Impatient readers are of course free to think of law reviews, schools, or firms in place of the manufacturers and retailers named below.
automobile that was made by General Motors (and identified as such).6 The auto makers can be described as cooperating with re spect to the research and production skills of tire makers by buying from common sources and declining to insist on exclusive supply arrangements or exclusive labeling. They seem unwillin g, however, to go so far as to trade directly with one another. In other indus tries, of course, competitors do sometimes supply one another, as when Microsoft sells to Apple, and even in the auto industry there is some cross-supply of this kind. Most readers, however, will share in the observation that competitors often manifest a disinclination to cooperate.1 Put slightly diff erently, but persisting with the example of the automobile industry, we can consider cases where a single producer of a component enjoys a comparative advantage or is simply supe rior, perhaps because of an economy of scale. If the efficient sup plier is itself one of the auto makers, then experience suggests that competing auto makers will normally not cooperate despite the lower costs, which is to say Ford will not buy and install GM brakes in Ford cars. If, however, this supplier is a third party, then some times -but only sometimes -Ford and GM will cooperate; both will patronize the supplier and the third party's brakes, like tires, will be observed in both Ford and GM vehicles. The separation or impersonality offered by the market appears to be a necessary but 6. There are, of course, important examples of joint ventures in the auto industry, although it is perhaps notable that GM and Toyota share in such a venture while GM and Ford do not There is also the interesting question of identified versus anonymous suppliers. Generally speaking, if components are supplied by a firm with something of an independent reputation, then they are more likely to be identified as such to the consumer. But coopera tion itself may be more likely in some industries if the supplier is anonymous. Competing auto makers do, for instance, purchase a variety of auto body parts from common, unidenti fied suppliers. This choice, between identified and unidentified components, may have a great deal to do with the "original equipment tie." If consumers will buy replacement parts on their own, as is often true for tires but not for runnin g boards, then an auto maker may profit in the form of lower prices from its suppliers by buying things like tires and installin g them in new vehicles with the name of their outside maker clearly identified; the idea is that consumers may be overinclined to match the original equipment on their cars. Thus, Frre stone will "pay" Ford in the form of prices that may be even lower than Frrestone's marginal cost, but the maker of runnin g boards will not offer a similar discount to Ford. One reason not to pursue this matter is that it seems to have little bearing on the central puzzles here. GM might also offer parts to Ford at low prices in order to take advantage of consumer perceptions but we do not observe GM parts on Ford vehicles. The text concedes, however, that supply arrangements between competitors are found in other industries. I return to this mixed evidence below. See infra text accompanying notes 28-29.
7.
The contrast between implicit and explicit cooperation is less sharp than it might be even in the auto industry; there are components, ranging from engines to stereo systems, regarding which competitors seem unlikely to cooperate even tlrrough the use of a third party supplier. not a sufficient condition for cooperation when only implicit coop eration is tolerable.
A simple, tempting, and perhaps unrivaled explanation of the reason for market intermediation looks to hubris or poorly in formed consumers. Ford may simply have too much "pride" to sell a car with a GM part. Consumers who are bound by reputation or tradition to Ford may cease to buy these cars if they contain GM parts because the pres�nce of a competitor's output may signal neg ative rather than positive things about the state of Ford's products.
I examine these and other explanations below in section II.B and in Part III; the balance of the present section is occupied with several other illustrations of implicit cooperation.
The extent of implicit cooperation between rivals such as Ford and GM is fairly familiar. Such competitors do not use the same advertising agency, even where there may be an efficiency gain be cause separate agencies would need to engage in duplicative mar keting studies. It is possible that the competitors could employ rival advertising agencies which could in turn purchase consumer-survey or other marketing data from a single outside source. A twice removed supplier may thus overcome the disinclination to cooper ate precisely because of its increased separation from both competi tors. Somewhat similarly, but influenced perhaps by legal constraints, we do not expect Ford and GM to use the same law firm for the bulk of their legal services. This disinclination, and the legal norm which may drive it, is likely to sacrifice potential gains from a combination of specialization and economies of scale. We certainly do not expect Ford to purchase services from GM's in house legal counsel, car designer, or marketing expert. A fabulously talented lawyer or car designer, with enough ideas and energy to service multiple clients, may find it impossible to exploit this talent unless, perhaps, there is sufficient separation; Ford and GM might patronize the same investment banker, especially if their issuance plans develop years apart, which might in tum use a single lawyer. Ford and GM might, however, go to the same law firm for specialized work in environmental defense or insurance matters.
The rules of professional responsibility which apply to lawyers do not explain all these patterns. The markets-as-facilitators idea is at least as useful in describing these configurations, although it re mains to be seen whether it is of much predictive utility.
Rival mail-order retailers offer a comparable example, although new puzzles arise along with each illustration. It is remarkable how little overlap there is between a Lands' End and an L.L. Bean cata-logue. Indeed, a fair amount of text in each of these catalogues gives the impression of a company seeking out exclusive suppliers whose products or workmanship may not be available through any other retailer. Some items are, however, explicitly labeled as com ing from well-known suppliers whose goods can be purchased through other means. Thus, a recent Lands' End catalogue carried recognized brands of (Harris Tweed) sportcoats, (Rockport) walk ing shoes, and (Coach) belts-all of which were offered as alterna tives to the catalogue company's "own" labels. But it would be truly startling to find a product with the L.L. Bean label in this Lands' End catalogue. Moreover, an outsider's item that is fea tured in one of these catalogues is then very .unlikely to be found in the competitor's catalogue. The disinclination to cooperate in this manner seems to generate an obvious efficiency loss as reflected in the contrasting fact that most conventional retailers' offerings over lap with those of their competitors. Both Bloomingdale's and Kro ger's offer store brands in an exclusive manner, but the vast majority of the items they carry are identified as coming from outside suppliers and are also found in competing department stores and supermarkets. One distinction between mail-order and fixed-location retailers is that it is cheaper for consumers to "visit" two catalogues when searching for one item or even a basket of goods than it is to visit two department stores or supermarkets.8
But this distinction does not address the disinclination to cooperate with respect to third-party suppliers. Moreover, mail-order custom ers can be expected to value their time especially highly, and we might expect many of these customers to shop in a given evening with but one catalogue, paying a premium to find the best selection or option in that one venue.9 8. On the other hand, undiversified, single-brand stores do not seem less important a part of that industry than are single-brand catalogues in mail-order retailing. The distinction based on search costs may therefore be unhelpful.
9. I will not try to solve all these puzzles of where we do and do not find cooperationeven of the explicit kind. Consider, for example, the case of a delicatessen, Z, which makes fabulous bread in its bakery. If Z's bread is also sold at local grocery stores or even at other delicatessens in the same town as Z, we might be unsurprised by the explicit cooperation, figuring that Z profits from its superior product. Any disinclination of these other stores is overcome by their recognition of the fact that they would lose customers who would go else where, or simply to Z itself, to buy bread and then might not return for other groceries or foodstuffs. On the other hand, if Z refuses to sell to competitors, we might conclude that Z hopes to attract bread-loving consumers who will then buy other products from Z. The claim must be that Z may not be able to discriminate as successfully by simply raising the price of its bread because it cannot raise the price just for these bread lovers. In short, many arrange ments and practices seem to be consistent with rationality, and Z's actual practice (which was once to hold all bread as its own, later to sell a few of its many varieties of bread to compet ing stores, and now apparently to sell all of its varieties to other parties who sell the bread at [Vol. 97:216 Closer to home is the intriguing example of cooperation among universities. There are notable examples of joint ventures among universities, even alongside intense competition; in the interest of specificity my focus is on the apparent fact of noncooperation among American law schools. Neighboring schools would seem to offer obvious opportunities for advantageous contractual arrange ments with one another or through third parties because students and faculty could easily share common resources. Cooperation would permit these schools to capture the benefits of economies of scale, specialization, and under-exploited skills and investments.
There is, however, very little cooperation of this kind among close competitors. Law schools located in the same city expend substan tial resources on clinical programs that might often be combined in order to offer students training that is close to their developing in terests. Analogously, these schools might attract graduate students by offering combined programs with access to specialized courses in multiple institutions. Gains from trade would seem to be available where each school otherwise offers a course on an irregular basis or to a handful of students. Investments in faculty members could be shared in a similar fashion. Two schools might be able to share the costs and benefits of an unusually expensive investment or of some one who specializes in a field that makes it difficult for one school alone to justify an appointment. Schools might even share in fund raising or recruiting ventures, although any disinclination to coop erate in these arenas might be attributed to obvious hazards and agency problems especially where they compete for the same stu dents or donors. In any event, examples of such contractual ar rangements are not unknown, but I think it fair to stipulate that they are rare.10 Any experienced faculty member or administrator might think of hundreds of ways in which proximately located and comparable schools could cooperate in direct fashion, and yet only a small number of explicitly cooperative ventures can be identified at the institutional level.11 Law journals, clinics, and specialized the same retail price as Z) may not cast much light on the various puzzles posed by other actors and in other industries.
10. Schools do occasionally share the travel costs of applicants for faculty positions or itinerant presenters of papers at faculty workshops. These examples of cooperation seem trivial if only because an outsider's request for reimbursement from both hosts would amount to profitable and conventionally unethical overrecoveries. More interesting and more com mon sharing arrangements involve library collections because conventional wisdom would not have suggested exceptional efficiencies in this area.
11. At the personal, individual level there is much more cooperation. Faculty members at competing law schools invite each other to intellectual events, call on each other as referees and colleagues, and share information about candidates on the job market. These explicit examples of cooperation do not generate charges of disloyalty but they are also remarkably courses offer easy examples of ventures that might sensibly prosper from cooperation.
Taken one at a time, each of these examples presents a number of puzzles. In the aggregate is the further theoretical puzzle of ex plaining both the survival of what seems to be an inefficient inclina tion against cooperation alongside some surprising instances of cooperation, especially of the implicit kind. The market-as facilitator idea leads to a lower estimate of the efficiency costs of the failure to cooperate explicitly but it generates additional puzzles as to the location of both explicit and implicit cooperation. Com peting law schools regularly use identical casebooks, they may out fit offices and libraries with identical computers and research services, they use the same architects who specialize in designing university buildings, they all use the results of the Law School Ad missions Test, and they even employ the same outside consultants to advise them on such things as fundraising campaigns and public relations. Indeed, the law school example is perhaps less puzzling than others because these schools appear completely to tolerate im plicit cooperation through markets and outside suppliers. Most re tailers, by way of comparison, seem completely intolerant of explicit cooperation but more inconsistent in their willin gness to co operate through third parties.
B. Explaining Implicit Cooperation
Firm Pride
Even if the distinction between implicit and explicit cooperation succeeded in predicting all instances in which cooperation among competitors was and was not found, the question would remain why impersonal markets should so pave the way for shared ventures. I have already suggested the simplest and most obvious possibility, that a kind of pride envelops many organizations -and peoplesuch that it is diffi cult to ask for help, even to pay for help, or to concede that others do some things better.12 We are accustomed to people who seem incapable of asking directions when they are lost, who insist on fixing things themselves and who take it as a sign of informal, avoiding for example any explicit terms of exchange. A remarkable example in the opposite camp is that there is little if any co-authorship between faculty members at neigh boring law schools.
12. And this is the case even though economic thinking suggests rather strongly that spe cialization in the area of one's comparative advantage can lead to mutual advantage so that trading with another party does not imply that the other has an absolute advantage, or supe riority, in producing that which it makes and sells.
weakness when someone employs a professional repair person.
Business enterprises are run by people and so it is plausible that we should expect similar instances of refusals to outsource. Moreover, even if competitive pressures disallow such concerns, customers may have these views and may regard firms that need outside help as somehow weak and not worth patronizing. Firms, therefore, might do better by signaling that they are infinitely capable and self-contained.
This view does not perfectly predict or resolve the othenvise puzzling patterns that we find. It would fit the facts better if all cooperation were dodged or if apparent opportunities for implicit cooperation were rejected precisely where the outsider would sup ply something at the core of the enterprise, pertaining to the histori cal strength of the disinclined firm, or especially visible to outside observers. Indeed, these distinctions provide some predictive power. Even the proudest firm buys such things as light bulbs and post-it notes from outsiders who may well supply their competitors.
Similarly, auto makers seem more likely to buy stereo systems and leather seat covers from outsiders than they do engines and axles, and they seem most likely to buy in cooperative fashion, which is to say from nonexclusive suppliers who may also deal with competing auto makers, when even less significant or distinctive components -such as unfashioned aluminum or headlamps -are concerned.
Light bulbs and sheets of aluminum are not at the core of Ford's enterprise, they are not part of its historical mission, and their ori gin is not much noticed by purchasers of Ford's vehicles, so that outsourcing is unlikely to be thought of as reflecting weakness. But it is difficult to distinguish sound systems and air bags from twelve volt batteries and tires with these variables.
If pride is too unscientific and irrational a concept for this exer cise, then it is tempting to convert the argument into one about reputation and consumers' reactions to products with intruding components. Part III discusses the possible role of consumer igno rance in understanding disinclinations to cooperate quite generally, but, as for the narrower question of the preference for explicit rather than implicit cooperation, it is difficult to make much of con sumer ignorance. If Lands' End would lose more loyal or ignorant customers than it would gain by offering a superior selection which included L.L. Bean products, perhaps because these customers would interpret the offering as a confession that Lands' End's own products were inferior, then it is hard to see why it would not be just as grave an error to offer Harris Tweed jackets. Catalogue afi-cionados may insist that these outside suppliers allow Lands' End to offer noncompeting products, in the sense that these particular la bels are a slight step up from the house brand.13 But this subtlety, even if correct, seems inconsistent with the claim of consumer igno rance because ignorance and subtlety do not dance well together.
Unsurprisingly, these catalogues' texts give no indication that the intruding labels are superior to the catalogue's own best offerings.
And ignorance does not help to explain the practice of nonoverlap ping arrangements with outside suppliers whose products might otherwise be seen in multiple rival mail-order catalogues.
Pride and reputation are similarly unhelpful in explaining exam ples of implicit cooperation. Rival mail-or�er retailers are willin g to use the same third-party delivery services. Comparable depart ment stores may not carry one another's labels, but they do implic itly cooperate by carryin g such items as Ferragamo shoes and Ralph Lauren shirts. These examples of behavior that seems uninformed by considerations of pride and reputation may nevertheless offer useful illustrations of decisions to buy rather than make.· More complete refusals to cooperate might have generated decisions to make and grow internally or, perhaps, to shrink into the shape of a specialized retailer.
Markets as Equal Dividers
An interesting possibility is that markets are useful because they offer a method for smoothly sharing the gains from trade. The rough claim is that bilateral monopolists will often negotiate to a stalemate so that the extra transaction cost of an outside supplier, or competing outsiders, may be worthwhile.14 Cases obviously exist where markets facilitate implicit cooperation in the conventional sense that unrelated parties are brought together through the ef forts of entrepreneurs, but the cooperation referred to here often involves parties who are all too aware of one another's existence.
There is a perspective from which Bloomingdale's can be seen as the product of implicit cooperation among thousands of consumers 13. Lands' End may seek to raise the average quality of the goods it impresses upon customers. It offers superior products but does not offer less expensive, lower quality prod ucts attached to a specific outsider's label. Presumably, the gain from improved selection is more than offset by the fear that consumers will either attribute the lower quality to Lands' End itself or simply decline to read the catalogue as thoroughly once they see items they do not like. 16. One of the interesting things about final offer arbitration is that it has been put in place by explicit agreement of adversarial parties and, even where imposed on them, its strat egy of giving the outsider less fl exibility than other forms of arbitration draws on the effi ciency we might associate with explicit rather than implicit cooperation.
A more qualified claim about markets as pie-splitting devices is that, in some settings, the expected cost of agreeing on a division of gains exceeds the cost of resorting to a market. One intriguing pos sibility is that implicit cooperation through the market comes close to guaranteeing an equal division, or perhaps maximin solution, which may be important for competitors who adopt risk averse strategies aimed at ensuring that their competitors do not gain any relative cost advantage.17 It is possible that an outside supplier gives a better price to another customer� but this is more easily overcome than is the problem of collusion between one's competitor-coventurer and a mutually employed agent.18 Worse is the prospect of cooperating by buying from one's competitor an in put that both need and that the competitor makes. The competitor has superior information about costs and can easily charge more than its internal cost. In short, implicit cooperation through mar kets may be a tool for ensuring an acceptable, perhaps equal divi sion of gains among competitors.
I refer to this markets-as-equal-dividers idea as a qualified claim about the nature of markets as facilitators -as opposed to the rougher, more intuitive claim that competitors abhor explicit coop eration but sometimes tolerate cooperation that is less evidentboth because it cannot do the entire descriptive job on its own and because it is a bit ex post in its character. Its inadequacy is evident in the case of competing law schools, for instance. The competition between New York University and Columbia Law Schools, to take two rivals who could cooperate more than they do, does not have terribly much to do wfth prices and profit margins. If, contrary to fact, we found a much higher ratio of explicit to implicit coopera tion between these schools than was observed between rival auto makers or mail-order retailers, then the equal division argument would be quite appealing because the relative importance of im plicit cooperation and equal division of gains would be linked to competitors who paid a great deal of attention to profits and prices.19 Instead, the law school example suggests that something else, perhaps simply the rough claim about individuals' emotional reactions to competitors, unconstrained or imperfectly constrained by market forces, is in the air.
17. The idea is that if not for risk aversion they might be happy to compete with one another for a better price in the marketplace.
18. The outsider is subject to competitive pressure from new entrants. 19. In other words, if there were relatively more cooperation in the for-profit sector, then implicit cooperation could be easily associated with price competition, and risk aversion re garding the division of gain or relative cost advantages.
The ex post quality of the claim about markets-as-equal-dividers is apparent when considering cases such as law schools' implicit co operation with respect to outside fundraising consultants and auto makers' disinclination to use the same advertising agencies but will ingness to advertise in the same media. If schools declined to coop erate over consultants, we might attribute their behavior to fears of getting advice that was too close to what their competitors received or, perhaps, so dissimilar as likely to be inferior. The fact that some firms cooperate by employing outside consultants can be explained instead by suggesting either that equal division of the raw (mone tary) kind is unimportant to these organizations20 or that the schools are sophisticated customers who can always reject the con sultant's advice if it seems biased, inferior, or inappropriate to their competitive positions. Similarly, the distinction that auto makers seem to draw between advertising agencies and media may reflect fears that advertising campaigns will be insufficiently competitive -favoring one's adversary -and that creative geniuses who are difficult to monitor might devote more energy or use their best ideas to satisfy a competitor's needs. In contrast, the location and even prices of media slots are easier to monitor and are only ran domly advantageous. If, however, we observed the reverse set of inclinations to cooperate, so that advertising agencies were shared while media outlets were not, it would be possible to believe the opposite, that agencies' commissions promoted equal treatment21 while the dearth of information about the true cost of, say, televi sion time -and especially of the premiums paid for the most popu lar time slots -accounted for the refusal to share even implicitly in this market.22 Ex post rationalizations can be the source of truth or at least of elegance, but there is a justifiable inclination to regard these sorts of explanations as tainted and unscientific.
20.
And the inclination not to cooperate with respect to permanent fundraisers or devel opment programs would need to be explained on simpler transaction cost or signaling grounds.
21.
Analogously; of all the problems and puzzles posed by real estate agents, there does not seem to be a fear that they will unequally divide the gains from cooperation. See Saul Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts in Agency Arrangements: Lawyers, Real Estate Bro kers, Underwriters, and Other Agents' Rewards, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 503 (1993) .
22. Note that while real estate agents cooperate explicitly in many regions by publishing magazines in which competing real estate brokers buy pages (and bypass local newspapers), competing auto makers do not advertise in this explicitly parallel manner although, to a lim ited degree, some do cooperate through single dealerships.
The Future of Implicit Cooperation
Other examples supporting the markets-as-equal-dividers and markets-as-pride-preservers ideas are offered below butthe overall impression will , I think, remain the same. These ideas take us a long way toward explaining instances of explicit and implicit coop eration, as well as apparent refusals to cooperate, but they do not quite rise to the level of reliable predictors. Further thought may point to additional or alternative variables which succeed in form ing a really useful theory of cooperation.
The discussion has implicitly assumed that the world we observe is characterized by fairly competitive firms in a sort of equilibrium.
Some latitude has been granted for hubris, pride, and fear. Indeed, absolutely perfect competition might be inconsistent with the rough claim about markets as facilitators of cooperation and even with the more nuanced claim of markets-as-equal-dividers.
Some readers will prefer a more futuristic and perhaps optimis tic perspective, motivated by the reasoning that competition will eventually drive out petty human foibles. Entire industries do look diff erent now that competition has become more globalized, and it is easy to put some stock in the idea that innovation, efficiency, new management techniques, and comparative advantage dominate while tradition, incremental change, and a good deal of neoclassical economic thinking decline. From this perspective, Columbia and NYU law schools might continue to recall ancient snubs or to de cline to minimize some costs because of emotions such as envy, pride, and condescension, but auto makers, retailers, and other par ticipants in less protected markets will be unable to afford such sen timents. This view assumes that efficiency considerations alone suggest more cooperation than is presently found,23 and it insists that at the very least we will observe more implicit cooperation as innovators develop low-transaction-cost methods of serving multi ple firms. A piece of supporting evidence is that many of the indus tries in which we observe regular, explicit cooperation tend to be quite competitive. For example, competitor airlines serve as agents for one another, selling seats on one another's flights, and overbooked hotels place disappointed customers in competing es tablishments.24 But even if global competition will generate in-23. See infra Part III. 24. Note that the theories advanced in the present essay are necessarily incomplete be cause I make no further attempt to explain which firms or industries will fail to display a disinclination to cooperate. For every airline-industry sort of example there is a mail-order retailer kind of counterexample with plenty of competition but little cooperation. Indeed, creased cooperation, the tradeoff between implicit and explicit cooperation remains important with the former dominating where specialization or other advantages favor third-party facilitators over direct trades. The notion of a disinclination to cooperate may, how ever, join other pieces of useless and now unaffordable pomp and ceremony in the bins of institutional history.
I hesitate to join in this view with too much enthusiasm or confi dence. First, it is difficult to draw the line between consumption and production costs. An affluent society can afford ceremonies and inefficiencies; economists learn to relabel them as consumption decisions. If enough people have a taste for corporate identities ("our way of doing things") and the like, then cooperative opportu nities will continue to be rejected. Second, there are always func tional explanations for noncooperation. Making rather than buying, or buying from nonoverlapping suppliers, can always be ex plained ex post as promoting learning, monitoring for quality, and so forth. It is therefore difficult to know what level of cooperation to associate with perfect competition. Even as we learn about ad vantages of cooperation we appreciate gains from exclusivity, itself a form of noncooperation. This is probably not the place to develop other perspectives on the future of cooperation, for the immediate point is simply that if we believe in parties' disinclination to cooperate in some settings, then conventional thinking about the make-or-buy decision re quires modification. Predicting the future, or discerning whether this disinclination is a costly taste or an efficient proxy, is a question about the long-term trend in make-or-buy decisionmaking rather than an inquiry into the size and behavior of presently observable firms.
Ill . ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON FIRM BOUNDARIES AND NONCOOPERATION
A. Introduction and the Possibility of Unpuzzling Cooperation
The discussion in Part II explored the idea of markets as means of implicit cooperation by beginnin g to puzzle over the apparent tolerance for impersonal markets in some of the settings where ex plicit cooperation seems unacceptable. The puzzle was to explain when implicit cooperation was itself likely to be observed. The dis cussion offered some possible keys to a positive and predictive thethe airline industry itself offers a mixed message because inter-carrier booking was also the norm when that industry was much less competitive than at present. 26. The modest cooperation among law firms tbat is observed witb respect to outside libraries highlights the absence of coventures (or rentals) by firms occupying a single office building where tbey might, for example, maintain a single library. An optimist would say tbat law firms fear the inappropriate exchange of information if tbeir lawyers use tbe same tables and books, but tben it is mysterious that tbese lawyers are permitted to use university or bar association libraries where such inadvertent exchanges might also take place. It is possible that implicit cooperation through not-for-profit organizations reflects a bias in favor of this sort of limited cooperation generated by the tax system. 27. Indeed in some of tbese cases, such as tbat involving travel expenses, it is almost difficult to see how each firm could proceed without some sharing of expenses.
An extreme example makes the arguments on both sides quite clear. Neighboring and sometimes hostile countries are known not only to purchase the same military aircraft from a single outside source, but also to rely on the source country to provide training for pilots. Put differently, part of the mystery of cooperation are the examples where we might think that emotions like hubris and dis trust, as well as understandable fears regarding shared or overlap ping arrangements, run strongest, and yet we find striking albeit implicit cooperation.28 American and United Airlines quite self consciously cooperate when they both decide to buy a new Boeing aircraft. The second decisionmaker knows of the earlier move made by its competitor and also knows that imitation may even cause a competing manufacturer to cease production of its compet ing airliner. India and Pakistan go even further when they both buy F-16s because in that setting there must be some fear of nonneutral behavior by the third-party provider in the quality of training, the disclosure of secrets, or the later supply of spare parts.29 The opti mist would say that these are additional examples of implicit coop eration among competitors and that occasional self-containment found in other examples does not reflect an inefficient disinclina tion to cooperate. Alternatively, it is arguable that the third-party supplier of military aircraft is trusted because its reputation for even-handedness is critical to its dominance of the market. Mean while, the puzzler might say that India and Pakistan would prefer not to cooperate but there is simply no second source offering equivalent aircraft.
Other examples come to mind but the essential point needs, I think, no additional confirmation: the puzzle of the sometime coex istence of competition and cooperation is fairly subjective. As with so many puzzles about rational behavior, a reasonable person might think that there is no puzzle to explain. Even if the amount of ex plicit cooperation among certain kinds of competitors were zero, while scores of examples of potential but unseen implicit coopera tion through markets were enumerated, an honest observer could think that these realities simply reflected dispassionate transaction 28. There are very few cases that can be described in this manner where exp licit coopera· tion is actually found. I do not dwell on these cases because the very nature of the mistrust raises the problem of interpreting cooperation, which can simply be rationalized as an exam· pie of two enemies wishing to keep a close eye on one another. To take a political example, the Democrats and Republicans might sometimes entrust a sensitive matter to an independ· ent outsider but at other times choose to appoint a joint venture with personnel drawn from the ranks of the party faithful but with an equal number from each party.
29.
The example thus weakens any claim that cooperation is avoided where there is confi· dential information at stake. cost minimization. Fo rd does sell cars with the very same tires found on comparable cars made by GM, such an observer might note, so why insist that they should offer the same engine whether made by an outside supplier who supplies both auto makers or by GM itself? Such an observer might be interested in some discus sion of legal barriers to cooperation but the make-or-buy expres sion would largely capture the decisionmaking which determines the boundaries of the firm. The observer who shares the intuition that Ford (or GM) chooses not to cooperate is most interested in the question of when competitors do cooperate, explicitly and im plicitly .30 And this perspective recharacterizes the inquiry into make-or-buy as influenced by the disinclination to cooperate even so far as to cause firms sometimes neither to make nor buy.
B. Alternative Explanations of No ncooperation
Slack and No t-for-Profit Enterprises
The example of noncooperation between law schools combined with the possible role played by pride suggests that some attention be paid to the idea that noncooperation may be a taste affordable by not-for-profit organizations and by firms operating in imperfect, profit-oriented markets where there is sufficient slack to finance prideful tastes. GM might be described as less disinclined to coop erate than it was in the days before robust global competition. And a country purchasing military hardware, the argument might pro ceed, can ill afford to satisfy its emotional preferences when life and death may be at issue.
There are obvious inconsistencies in this story. Retailers oper ate in an extremely competitive environment and yet, as we have seen, they too can appear disinclined to cooperate. Law firms have broken many traditions as competition among them has sharpened, but still they do not rent one another's associates. There is no shortage of examples of tough and otherwise lean competitors who seem to eschew cooperation. Moreover, the idea of linking this in clination to some kind of prideful sentiment did not hold up on close inspection nearly as well as the claim that markets served to guarantee equal divisions of gains from trade. Iri turn, neither a desire for equal division nor the ability of impersonal markets to
For what it is worth, I
have not yet encountered a faculty member or administrator at Columbia or NYU who thought those schools' behavior could be explained by anything but unilateral or mutual disinclinations to cooperate. generate such division of gains from trade offers much of a reason to distinguish profit-seeking from other enterprises.
I have suggested elsewhere that not-for-profit organizations might tackle the make-or-buy choice in a manner that is different from profit-seeking enterprises.31 In particular, my claim was that the former group might be slower to expand but also slower to con tract. I do not see a need to retreat from this claim, but the greater the role played by the disinclination to cooperate the less important the distinction between profit-oriented and not-for-profit firms.
Consumer Ignorance or Product Differentiation
Another approach draws on the idea that firms may survive or profit because of imperfect markets and consumer ignorance. Igno rance is of course often related to slack if only because market power may derive more from excessive brand loyalty than from structural barriers to entry and the like. In any event, it is possible that competing law schools rarely cooperate because they perceive that cooperation will be taken as a sign of weakness so that they will lose in the market for students, employers, or even faculty.
Tw o elite law schools might both lose out to other law schools, or perhaps simply to others in that city or region, if the two cooperate.
I refer to this explanation as one based on consumer ignorance because, in theory, consumers should evaluate products and prices with little concern about the source of inputs. If Chrysler or Co lumbia sells a car or education with components supplied by maj or competitors, consumers might do well to conclude that the well informed manufacturer or assembler they have selected has decided that the best supplier of that particular component happens to be an outsider. The intruding component might signal the presence of a flexible, sensible assembler who is unswayed by anything resem bling pride, which in this context can be of negative value to the consumer. On the other hand, the component may signal declining internal quality control, excessive attention to short-run costs, or other things that ought to worry purchasers of complex products. A problem with this sort of thinking is that positive signals are easy to imitate or contrive, so that they are of little value in a world with rational or thoughtful actors. In tum, an explanation of competi tion and cooperation that is based on the idea of cooperation as a negative signal must assume some significant irrationality or ignorance.
31. See Levmore, supra note 4, at 356-58.
An alternative perspective is to think of the assembler as engag ing in strategic decisionmaking rather than appealing to ignorant consumers. One law school or auto maker may avoid mixing in a competitor's inputs because it expects to gain from forcing consum ers to make a starker choice. Put slightly diff erently, a firm may capitalize on its comparative advantage by engaging in significant product diff erentiation; advantages may be dissipated if shared with a competitor. For better or worse, this kind of claim is not easily disproved. When Ford and GM offer identical tires, it is arguable that each calculates that it will gain by competing with respect to other components. When they decline to cooperate it can be ar gued that at least one of these competitors expects to gain from forcing consumers to choose between its product and those made by competitors -which differ on many counts.
A fair amount of circumstantial evidence supports the consumer ignorance version, or explanation, of competition and cooperation, and much of this evidence might also be marshaled in support of the product diff erentiation perspective. Consider, for example, the fact that local governments often cooperate not only by patronizing specialized third-party suppliers but also by explicitly buying and selling services among themselves. It is not unusual for a city to sell firefighting services or to supply water or natural gas to a neighbor ing jurisdiction. Jo int ventures are another common means by which local governments exploit economies of scale. At the state level, other forms of cooperation are noteworthy. Neighboring states sometimes have reciprocal or fee-driven arrangements which enable residents of one state to attend state-supported universities in the other. When an arrangement permits residents of a state with no veterinary school, medical school, or law school to attend one in another state, there is an obvious economy of scale but also, by negative implication, cooperation only where there is no compe tition and no danger of a negative signal.32 In any event, these in stances of cooperation might be traced to the distinction between profit-oriented and other enterprises, but I have already marked that route and little would be gained by traveling it once again ex-32. But the lack of cooperation when both states have these schools does not necessarily reflect a disinclination to cooperate or a belief that cooperation sends negative signals. The potential gain in consumer choice or specialization may simply be more than offset by the transaction costs of the arrangement. In most instances where there is no explicit coopera tion between neighboring states, residents of one state can apply as would residents of any other state to the host state's school. The question of cooperation arises only where tuition and admission preferences in a nearby state might reduce the political pressure for duplica tive investments in facilities. (Vo l. 97:216 cept to point out that political jurisdictions or politicians may be less risk averse than private :firms about unequal divisions of the gains from trade. Emphasis is better placed, I think, on the possi bility that jurisdictions compete less fiercely than do manufacturers.
Ford may worry that if it offers a car with a GM component, loyal Ford consumers will begin to think that Fo rd is confessing a decline in its own abilities. Alternatively, Ford may reason, contrary to the simple lesson of the spatial competition literature, that it gains from greater product differentiation. To the extent that local jurisdic tions compete for new residents and businesses they too might either fear sending negative signals or wish to differentiate them selves from one another as a competitive strategy. But some polit ical jurisdictions, most notably states, might need to worry much less about exit than most retailers and manufacturers because op portunities for consumer relocation are more limited. If, in turn, there is indeed more cooperation among state governments than among competing private :firms, then the signaling, product differ entiation, and perhaps consumer ignorance notions ought to gain credence.
Another piece of supporting evidence, albeit of the negative kind, is that competing profit-oriented :firms seem willin g to borrow from the same lenders. Not only do they appeal to the same pur chasers of their stocks and bonds but they also use the same com mercial banks and financial intermediaries. As always, there may be efficiency gains from cooperation; specialized lenders may have already invested in information about the given industry. The lack of explicit cooperation is not terribly puzzling, for GM may fear that if it borrows directly from Ford the latter would one day call in its loans or exercise possible rights in collateral in pursuit of some strategic, market-grabbing aim that would be difficult to stop with ex ante contractual specifications. And if, contrary to fact, we found competitors disinclined to cooperate even in implicit fashion, we might ascribe their behavior to fears about inappropriate infor mation exchanges or fiduciary problems. It happens that there is remarkably little in the way of fiduciary or other legal constraints where lending is concerned, and there is a fair amount of implicit cooperation.33 This cooperation can in tum be taken as evidence that where there is a disinclination to cooperate there is likely to be a problem of negative signaling; the fungibility of money means that borrowing from one source as opposed to another sends no signals. Noncooperation may also be linked through this example to consumer ignorance because even impressionable, unsophistica ted consumers might be thought to understand that there is not nor mally much to be learned from the identity of GM's lender, be it Chase Manhattan Bank, Ford, or an outsider who does not lend to Ford. Fi nally, cooperation in the form of overlapping credit ar rangements is consistent with the product differentiation argument; a Ford car and a Columbia education look very different from prod ucts offered by their competitors because they contain few identical components -but the source of funds is not something visible to consumers and competitors can therefore share creditors without sacrificing any product differentiation.
The maj or weakness with the signaling and product differentia tion explanations is that they fail to explain the mix of implicit co operation and contrary disinclinations. If Ford would signal something negative or cleverly differentiate its product by offering a car with a component that is also found on a GM product, why then is this apparently not the case for tires? And why would law students be especially attracted to self-contained producers who are Note that this last example favors both the equal division and product differentiation ideas. Harvard and Northeastern -which proudly announce their different aims and markets -do not coop-34. The consumer ignorance explanation might be salvaged with some painstaking identi fication of consumers' perceptions regarding the core function of an enterprise, with the idea being that cooperation in this core is what threatens to transmit a negative signal. The in quiry is then similar to that mentioned earlier in connection with firm pride. Cooperation with respect to tires but not engines is consistent with either of these theories. 
Labor versus Capital
Some of the examples adduced thus far suggest that competitors are more willin g to engage in implicit cooperation with respect to capital than labor. Law schools rarely share faculty members but they do not seek exclusive arrangements36 with computer vendors, furniture makers, or research services. Competing auto makers do not cooperate with respect to employing designers, advertising agencies, and law firms, while they are willin g to buy steel and fin ished tires from the same suppliers.
35. Unless the perception is that Harvard gives up any claim in sciences and engineering while MIT shrugs off a variety of areas. There are in fact schools with catalogues that suggest credit for courses taken elsewhere only where the home school offers nothing comparable, but Harvard and MIT do not fall into this set and many of their faculty and administrators would strongly resist the extreme specialization claims that outsiders might make about these institutions.
36. I have avoided implicating the literature on exclusive dealing. The arrangements puz zled over here do not generally involve exclusive dealing, but rather something less than exclusivity. Moreover, the clever explanations advanced in such works as Howard P. 225 (1980) , are of little application to these puzzles of cooperation. Lands' End does sell belts other than Coach's and if Coach is happy to see its products alongside Lands' End's, it ought to be pleased to be seen in competitors' catalogues.
There may be something to this distinction but I hesitate to put much weight on it because it is often difficult to separate labor from capital. Competitors in some industries rarely share real estate, but is this an example of noncooperation with respect to a physical as set or with regard to the human services reflected in the negotia tions with a real estate agent or contractor?37 The example also suggests that labor may be a proxy for problems with fair division, with the labor-capital distinction doing no additional work. Simi larly, striking examples of noncooperation are found with respect to delivery services. The Wa shington Post and The Ne w Yo rk Times are rarely delivered by the same agent, although duplication of routes is quite remarkable.38 The example supports the labor capital distinction but even more forcefully bolsters the equal divi sion idea.
Moreover, there are striking counterexamples to explain. Com peting gasoline companies rarely if ever cooperate explicitly at the retail level although there is some implicit cooperation by way of sales through independents with nonexclusive supply contracts. Ex plicit cooperation is easy to imagine. Exxon, Shell, and Mobil gas might be sold at a single station with customers selecting their brand at the pump much as these very gas stations often put Pepsi and Coke machines side by side.39 The efficiency gain from such 37. Note that neither pride nor negative signaling offers much in the way of an explana tion of the real estate example.
38. Other examples include milk delivery (where duplication and noncooperation may have accelerated the decline of the industry in favor of more frequent trips to grocery stores) and express mail. Fe deral Express and its competitors could cooperate by having a single messenger visit each small business location. In the long run, we may observe a kind of implicit cooperation of just this sort by way of businesses offering short-term monopolies to the lowest bidder from among the competing express services. There would still be some duplication of routes, unless the bids perfectly segregated the market geographically, but much less duplication of elevator trips and the like. Note that the United States Postal Ser vice -much more than Fe deral Express -does in fact explicitly cooperate by contracting for trucks and aircraft in a manner that permits cooperation with other shippers and travel 
39.
A tempting explanation for noncooperation is that retailers might mislead customers and suppliers by connecting hoses to underground tanks in a manner that simply delivered the cheapest gas to the customer regardless of the latter's expressed preference at the pump. But this explanation standing alone is unconvincing because cooperation might still be worth while through a dealer who precommitted to buy gas from competing suppliers at a uniform price, because occasional monitoring with severe penalties ought to discourage dealer fraud, and because we find single-brand stations offering several grades of gasoline even though a similar fraud problem presents itself with these tanks. The brand-name supplier's incentive to monitor means that inter-brand fraud is probably less serious a problem than the fairly will one day be used by Lands' End to the detriment of L.L. Bean. These examples make the law school world all the more intriguing because there are few secrets in that industry but yet little coopera tion of a certain kind.
In the end, the success of a new explanatory theory is often a subjective matter. In a world with noise and imperfect insight, rea sonable people can disagree about whether conventional explana tions are adequate, and new explanations come with their own triumphs and weaknesses. Much depends on subjective assess ments of striking successes and puzzling failures.
explanation might be tried for the question of why restaurants do not offer both Coke and Pepsi while grocery stores do. In this case, however, the fraud explanation is even weaker because of the presence of restaurant patrons with refined taste buds.
40.
The equal division explanation is somewhat more successful, although cooperation and equal division would seem manageable through the use of a cost·sharing formula based on gallons sold. It is difficult to think of reasons why gasoline should be such a prominent example of an item sold through stand-alone retailers. A store that sells only Coach leather products or Krispy Kreme donuts can focus its marketing efforts and enjoy other advantages, but then it loses some gains from cooperation in terms of off-peak hours and attracting con sumers who care about reducing their shopping time. Stand-alone donut stores have in fact given way somewhat to the creation of outlets in supermarkets and convenience stores, even though those stores carry competing products, but the combination seems sensible because these stores have serious overcapacity in the morning, donut hours. Gasoline is sometimes sold by convenience stores, but not alongside competing products.
1bis is not the place for an extended discussion of the limited role of law in influencing the make-or-buy-or-decline-to-share deci sion.41 But a few observations about the role of law are surely in order. A good starting point is to see that implicit cooperation may be compelled or discouraged by legal rules. If A is barred by law from dealing with B, but is permitted to do so by "cleansing" the transaction through a third party, C, then it may be that C's market success is rather simply explained. Similarly, if C is barred by such things as conflict of interest rules from transacting with both A and B, who are actual or potential competitors, then it may be the law that discourages cooperation and encourages A and B to be self contained and to grow.42
As for the overall influence of law on the siz� of a firm, or on the make-or-buy decision, much depends on whether the relevant legal rules have regulatory bite or simply provide default rules of the kind most parties would bargain for were they well informed and unimpeded by transaction costs. Law's impact might be posi tive if it offers the right default rules for resolving prickly problems with respect to sharing gains from trade, but negative if the law stands in the way of arrangements that would otherwise materialize in private markets .
My own view is that lawyers have historically and perhaps self ishly gravitated toward rather extreme solutions, in the name of fi duciary duties, to the conflicts that are present in these contexts. In contrast, most markets have evolved in a way that suggests a rather limited role for law and forced noncooperation. Put differently, even if it is correct to suggest that equal-division concerns explain a great deal of observed unregulated behavior, it may be unnecessary and inefficient to force equal division on parties. But these obser vations are only suggestive and subsidiary to the more general puz zles associated with · competition and cooperation and to the solutions explored here.43 41. For an extended discussion of just this topic, see Levmore, supra notes 4, 33.
42. Alternatively, the law may cause contraction if internal production is too costly.
43. I have intentionally advanced examples where the role of law is quite minimal. I have, for instance, avoided the case of cooperation in the form of competitors patronizing a single law firm for such things as environmental or insurance defense work. The companion paper, cited in note 33, discusses lawyers, bankers, trustees, government employees, and other third-party suppliers whose roles may be guided or constrained substantially by legal rules. [Vol. 97:216 CONCLUSION Some readers will not share my intuition that many competitors are in fact irrationally, or perhaps I should say disappointingly, dis inclined to cooperate. My aim has been to supply a better under standing of where we observe cooperation and where we do not. I have stressed the idea of thinking of markets as means of implicit cooperation that can offer a method of dividing gains from trade rather equally so as to facilitate further cooperation and efficiencies among competitors who are fe arful of bestowing cost advantages on one another. A variety of observations were illuminated by this idea of implicit cooperation as facilitating equal division.
In any event, I think it is evident that to the extent there is in deed something of a disinclination to share, whatever its origin and location, it has a significant bearing on the make-or-buy decision and firm size. In the course of covering many disparate examples, the analysis here has been subjective in its assessment of the degree of implicit cooperation that is observed, but observations about ex plicit cooperation seem much less open to interpretation. It is, of course, this kind of cooperation, involving the willingness or failure to trade directly, that most immediately affects the boundaries of the firm.
